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XI AlraANGEMENTThe Slumberland Bedding Company started in business in 1952 with a capitalization of $13,000. Within less than one year the corporation was "clearly
heavily insolvent,"1 having debts in excess of $85,000 and assets valued "at
least several thousand dollars less than $42,250.'12 Preferred creditor claims
against the assets of the business amounted to more than $32,200. In this
rather dismal context a petition for an arrangement under chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act was filed. A plan was submitted which provided for independent capital to be put into the business to pay certain claims in full and
to pay a twenty percent dividend to unsecured creditors. This twenty percent
payment was to constitute complete and final satisfaction of all unsecured
claims. The plan involved no substantial change which would reasonably
tend to make an earning enterprise out of this floundering venture. However,
the plan was in the best interest of present creditors since they would receive
far more under this plan than they could hope to receive via liquidation; therefore, a majority of creditors approved the plan. But three general creditors
petitioned to prevent court confirmation of the plan, basing their claim on the
assertion that the arrangement did not comply with the statutory mandate
that the plan be feasible.3 Held, petition denied. The test of feasibility is
fulfilled if there is a reasonable assurance that the unsecured creditors will get
what is provided for them under the plan. To be feasible a plan need not
embrace a probability of future financial and business success for the enterprise. In re Slumberland. Bedding Co., (D.C. Md. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 39.
The requirement of feasibility appears throughout the non-liquidation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act,4 but court interpretation of the term has not been
uniform. In the much litigated area of corporate reorganization, 5 case6 and
treatise7 authority agree that a plan is not feasible unless the result is a solvent
company which will have a reasonable prospect for future financial success.
On~ judge graphically expressed the policy behind this interpretation: " . . .
it was not the intention of Congress . . . to place crutches under corporate
cripples, fit subjects for liquidation, and send them out into the business world
BANKRUPTCY-TEST OF FEASIBILITY UNDER CHAPTER

1 This

was the expression used by the court. Principal case at 40.
Although apparently the court appointed appraisers, the opinion gives no more
definite value to the assets than that stated in the quoted phrase. Ibid.
3 "The court shall confirm an arrangement if satisfied that • • • (2) it is for the best
interests of creditors and is feasible••••" Bankruptcy Act §366, 66 Stat. L. 433, §35
(1952), 1 U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News 416 (1952).
4 Corporate reorganization: 52 Stat. L. 897, §221(2) (1938), 11 U.S.C. (1946)
§621(2); arrangement of unsecured indebtedness: note 3 supra; arrangement of secured
indebtedness: 66 Stat. L. 435, §43 (1952), 1 U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News 417 (1952);
wage earners plans: 66 Stat. L 437, §50 (1952), 1 U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News 419
(1952).
5 Chapter X proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act.
6 In re Barium Realty Co., (D.C. Mich. 1945) 62 F. Supp. 81, affd. with opinion
(6th Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 562; Sophian v. Congress Realty Co., (8th Cir. 1938)
98 F. (2d) 499.
' 7 6 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., p. 3883 (1947, 1952 Supp.).
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to be a menace to all who might purchase their securities or d,eal with them
on credit."8 However, as is demonstrated by the principal case, this interpretation under the corporate reorganization provisions of the statute is not
necessarily carried over into subsequent chapters dealing with arrangements.9
It might be questioned whether there is any basis in reason for such a distinction.10 The premise underlying all non-liquidation provisions of the Bankruptcy Act is the desirability for continuing debtors in business. The meaning
that the court gives to the requirement of feasibility will determine what kinds
of debtors will be so continued. Thus in corporate reorganization the courts
have ruled that none but corporations showing reasonable signs of health shall
be allowed to adventure again into the competitive field. The same policy
consider~tions should rule to prevent businesses having the advantages of court
arrangements from being allowed to continue their existence until µiey show
at least some prospect of mending their losing ways. Creditors dealing with
the smaller enterprises which are engaging in arrangements have just as great
a need for protection as do creditors dealing with the larger companies which
go through reorganization; very likely the need will be even greater in the
former case because the system of records from which credit information could
be received may well be less complete.
Some support can be found in other sections of the act for the view taken
by the court in the principal case. The statute provides that in arrangement
cases where there is unanimous approval of the plan by creditors, the court
should confirm without investigating feasibility.11 From this it could reasonably be inferred that the feasibility standard is not for the protection of the
outside business world, but only for the protection of those presently having
an interest in the business. If the latter parties' interests are best served by
the plan it should not be denied court approval because of probable future
disaster of the enterprise. But the effect of this view is to read out of the
statute the requirement of feasibility and leave only the consideration of the
question of whether or not the plan is in the best interests of creditors.12 Had

8

Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., (8th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 237 at 247.

Accord with the interpretation of the principal case: Matter of Nathanson, (Ref.
Ind. 1941) 50 Am. B. R. (n.s.) 465; In re Admiral Container Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1951)
9

95 F. Supp. 723, affd. per curiam (3d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 330; 8 CoLLlllR, BANK14th ed., p. 1171 (1947, 1952 Supp.).
.
10 In an earlier arrangement case the Supreme Court, in interpreting the phrase "fair
and equitable," had ruled that these were words of art and that an interpretation of them
under one section of the Bankruptcy Act must be carried over to other sections. Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 1 (1939). Why the
word-of-art analysis applies to "fair and equitable" but not to "feasible" is a question on
which the courts have not yet spoken.
11 The statute makes this provision by exclusion, not by direct statement.
In the
case of the unanimously approved plan the court is to confirm if certain conditions are
· met, and feasibility is not one of these conditions. 52 Stat. L. 911, §361 (1938), 11
u.s.c. (1946) §761.
.
12 Whether or not the plan is in the best interests of creditors is made a concurrent
test along with feasibility under §366 of the Bankruptcy Act. Note 3 supra.
RUPTCY,
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it been the intent of Congress to apply this single criterion rather than the
dual one, it probably would have left the second standard out of the act altogether.
Paul B. Campbell, S.Ed.

